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CASE COMMENT
A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR  
THE IMPLICATION OF TERMS IN FACT
GOH, YIHAN*
In Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL Holdings Pte Ltd,1 the Court of Appeal of Singapore 
once again reaffirmed the Singaporean courts’ rejection of the approach adopted 
by Lord Hoffmann in Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd,2 which 
characterised the implication of a term in fact as a process of contractual inter­
preta tion. What may be of interest to practitioners and academics of common law 
jurisdictions wrestling with the implications of the Belize approach is the Court of 
Appeal’s prescription of ‘a three­step process’ for the implication of terms in fact,3 
which is accompanied by an in­depth discussion of various conceptual aspects of 
this area of law. These observations provide a different insight into this area, and 
suggest a test that is more practically applicable than the Belize approach.
The facts in Sembcorp were complex but may be summarised for present 
purposes as follows. Sembcorp Marine Ltd (Sembcorp) entered into a joint 
venture with PPL Holdings Pte Ltd (PPL Holdings). The joint venture vehicle 
was PPL Shipyard Pte Ltd (PPL Shipyard), the shares of which were equally 
owned by Sembcorp and PPL Holdings. Subsequently, Sembcorp purchased a 
further 35% of the shares in PPL Shipyard from PPL Holdings pursuant to a 
Supplemental Agreement, bringing its share in PPL Shipyard to 85%. Following 
PPL Holdings’ attempted sale of its remaining shares in PPL Shipyard to a third 
party, Sembcorp sued PPL Holdings, alleging that it had breached, inter alia, 
several implied terms. On appeal, the only implied term still at issue was the 
so­called ‘Equality Premise Clause’, which Sembcorp alleged provided that the 
provisions in the Joint Venture Agreement and the Supplemental Agreement that 
were premised on equal shareholding would cease to subsist once either party 
acquired a majority shareholding. Chief amongst these affected provisions was 
* LLB (Hons) (NUS), LLM (Harvard). Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, National University of 
Singapore. I would like to record my thanks to Yip Man and an anonymous referee for the extremely 
helpful comments, as well to the student editors for their meticulous editorial work. All errors remain 
my own.
1 [2013] 4 SLR 193 (Singapore Court of Appeal (SGCA)).
2 [2009] UKPC 10, [2009] 1 WLR 1988 (Privy Council).
3 Sembcorp (n 1) [101].
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clause 5.1, entitling both parties to appoint three directors each to PPL Shipyard’s 
board ‘so long as they shall hold such number of shares . . . as are not less than 
the proportions set out herein’,4 the proportions being the original equal 
shareholding. There were other provisions in the Agreement that built upon this 
clause, providing for the quorum requirement for meetings, etc. Sembcorp’s aim 
in arguing that PPL Holdings had breached these terms was to exert effective 
control over PPL Shipyard.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Sundaresh Menon CJ prescribed a three­step 
process to guide the implication of terms in fact.5 The first step requires the court 
to ascertain that a gap in the contract has arisen because the parties had not 
contemplated the gap at the time of entering into the contract; it is only in such a 
situation that a term can be implied. Next, the court is to consider whether ‘it is 
necessary in the business or commercial sense to imply a term in order to give the 
contract efficacy.’6 Finally, the court is to consider ‘the specific term to be implied.’7 
A term is only to be implied if it passes the ‘officious bystander’ test—that is, the 
contracting parties, having regard to the need for business efficacy, would have 
responded positively to the suggestion of the term to be implied. This three­step 
process, being founded on the traditional ‘business efficacy’ and ‘officious 
bystander’ tests and making no mention of any process of interpretation, is 
necessarily premised on a rejection of the Belize approach. Applying this test, the 
Court allowed the implication of the Equality Premise Clause into the Joint 
Venture Agreement.
The Singaporean courts’ rejection of the Belize approach is not new and was in 
fact determinatively arrived at after a comprehensive survey of the judicial and 
academic authorities in Foo Jong Peng v Phua Kiah Mai.8 The Singapore Court of 
Appeal’s reasons for rejection need not be repeated here in detail;9 it suffices to 
say that the Court’s principal disagreement with the Belize approach centred on 
its view that the process of implication is to be kept separate from that of 
interpretation, and on the lack of practical guidance afforded by the Belize 
approach as to when a particular term ought to be implied. In this regard, the 
Court preferred the traditional ‘business efficacy’ and ‘officious bystander’ tests. 
This partially reflects the mixed reception that the Belize approach has had in 
England, with some cases citing Belize without actually applying it. Indeed, some 
cases purport to endorse Belize, but end up citing authorities that undermine the 
reasoning within. A good example of such a case is Mediterranean Salvage & Towage 
4 ibid [7].
5 ibid [101].
6 ibid (emphasis added).
7 ibid (emphasis added).
8 [2012] 4 SLR 1267 (SGCA).
9 For comment, see Yihan Goh, ‘Terms Implied in Fact Clarified in Singapore’ [2013] Journal of 
Business Law 237.
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Ltd v Seamar Trading & Commerce Inc.10 As Davies has pointed out,11 although Lord 
Clarke MR predicted in that case that Lord Hoffmann’s analysis in Belize will 
often be referred to, his Lordship nonetheless referred approvingly to the judgment 
of Sir Thomas Bingham MR in Philips Electronique Grand Public SA v British Sky 
Broadcasting Ltd,12 which, contrary to Belize, drew a clear distinction between the 
interpretation and implication of terms. The Singapore Court of Appeal’s three­
step process in Sembcorp thus affords an opportunity to re­examine this area of law 
and represents a continuing refinement of the applicable test in Singapore.
The first step in the Singapore Court of Appeal’s three­step process in Sembcorp 
raises some conceptual considerations. According to the Court, only those gaps 
that arise because the parties had not contemplated the issue (in the Court’s 
words, a ‘true’ gap13) can be remedied by the implication of a term. This, however, 
presupposes that there is already a gap since the enquiry is about the nature of such 
a gap, rather than its existence. The existence of a gap is dealt with by the second 
step of the enquiry, that is, whether it is necessary in the business or commercial 
sense to imply a term in order to give the contract efficacy. In the light of this, it 
may be more logical to place the second step ahead of the first step.14
More substantively, it is clear that implication is appropriate where the parties 
did not contemplate the issue at all, but this must be subject to some constraints 
lest the court rewrite the contract for the parties. As Sir Thomas Bingham MR 
said in Philips Electronique, where the contract is a novel one, ‘it is not enough to 
show that had the parties foreseen the eventuality which in fact occurred, they 
would have wished to make provision for it’.15 Instead, what is needed to imply a 
term is to show that ‘one of several possible solutions would without doubt have 
been preferred.’16 Indeed, in certain cases, the fact that the parties had not 
contemplated the issue is actually a reason against the implication of a term, the 
reason being that this might go against the parties’ intentions. An example is 
the old case of Hamlyn & Co v Wood & Co,17 where the plaintiffs argued for the 
implication of a term that the defendants would not voluntarily prevent themselves 
from continuing the sale of grains to the plaintiffs for a specified period. Lord 
Esher MR, with whom the other judges agreed, held that the term could not be 
implied because the defendant never contemplated such an outcome.18 In that 
case, the novel nature of the contract (that is, a negotiated contract between 
parties not coming within any predefined class), coupled with the finding that the 
10 [2009] EWCA Civ 531, [2010] 1 All ER (Comm) 1.
11 Paul S Davies, ‘Recent Developments in the Law of Implied Terms’ [2010] Lloyd’s Maritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly 140, 146, citing ibid [8], [17].
12 [1995] EMLR 472 (CA) 481.
13 Sembcorp (n 1) [94].
14 This point arose from a discussion with a colleague, for which the author is grateful.
15 Philips Electronique (n 12) 482.
16 ibid.
17 [1891] 2 QB 488 (CA).
18 ibid 493.
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defendant did not contemplate the outcome contended for, led to a denial of 
implication. Therefore, the fact that the parties did not contemplate the issue at 
and may not always result in implication. To be fair, the three­stage process in 
Sembcorp considers the parties’ contemplation (or the lack thereof ) only as an 
initial stage; whether a term will actually be implied seems to be dealt with by the 
other stages of the Court’s three­stage process. It is conceivable that, applied to 
the facts of Hamlyn & Co, the term concerned would still not be implied, albeit not 
due to the first stage.
In saying that only ‘true’ gaps are remediable by implication, the Court 
necessarily presupposes that other gaps are not so remediable. The Court identifies 
two possible instances of such ‘false’ gaps: first, where the parties contemplated the 
issue ‘but mistakenly thought that the express terms had adequately addressed it’ 
when in fact they did not; and second, where the parties ‘contemplated the issue’ 
but did ‘not agree on a solution’ and hence did not make any provision for it.19 This 
latter situation is uncontroversial: were a court to imply a term despite finding that 
the parties had considered but omitted to provide for a given issue, it would 
certainly be making the contract for the parties.20
The first ‘false’ gap—that is, where the parties had contemplated the issue but 
‘chose not to provide a term for it because they mistakenly thought that the 
express terms of the contract had adequately addressed it’21—deserves further 
comment. First, to be more precise, the parties in such a situation both contemplated 
and chose to provide a term for the issue; the problem is that the provided terms 
do not reflect such an intention. The parties’ intention to provide a term is important 
as it is indicative of an actual common intention in relation to the issue. 
Furthermore, the Court regarded implication as being irrelevant in this situation, 
preferring instead the ‘proper remedy’ of rectification of the instrument in 
equity.22 In adopting such a view, the Court is probably echoing the very clear 
distinction Mason J drew between implication and rectification in Codelfa 
Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales.23 While this accords 
with theoretical neatness, one should not lose sight of the fact that implication can 
also be relevant. A case may be better framed in terms of implication where it is 
difficult to show that the parties had mistakenly thought the express terms of the 
contract covered an issue they had intended to be dealt with. In other cases, 
certain documents cannot be rectified even though their terms do not accord with 
the parties’ intentions. The best example is provided by Belize, where the document 
at issue was the articles of association of a company, which had previously been 
held not to be rectifiable,24 thus explaining the Privy Council’s recourse to 
19 Sembcorp (n 1) [94]–[95].
20 ibid [95]. See also Philips Electronique (n 12) 482.
21 Sembcorp (n 1) [94].
22 ibid [96].
23 [1982] HCA 24, (1982) 149 CLR 337 (High Court of Australia) 346.
24 Scott v Frank F Scott (London) Ltd [1940] Ch 794 (CA).
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implication. This shows that implication is a necessary counterpart to rectification 
even on the same facts, notwithstanding the theoretical division that exists 
between the two.
The Singapore Court of Appeal’s desire to identify ‘true’ gaps which can be 
resolved by implication is perhaps motivated by an understandable desire to 
provide conceptual guidance in a difficult area of law. However, the distinction 
between a ‘true’ and ‘false’ gap may be very thin in practice. For example, the 
Court found that clause 5.1 fell within the second of the ‘false’ gaps: the parties 
had contemplated that, if they no longer had equal shareholding, then their rights 
to the stipulated board representation would no longer apply.25 There was thus no 
need to imply the Equality Premise Clause in respect of clause 5.1.26 However, 
this was not expressly spelt out in the clause. In saying that clause 5.1 embodied 
an express contemplation of the issue, the Court arguably imputed an intention 
to the parties in this respect—the very thing it said it was not supposed to do. As 
for the other clauses dependent on clause 5.1, the Court found that they were 
silent as to how the rights given under those clauses would be affected by a change 
in shareholding. The Court therefore found that the parties had not turned their 
minds to these issues,27 thereby giving rise to a ‘true’ gap. However, adopting the 
reasoning for clause 5.1, it could equally be said that parties had contemplated 
that these clauses must necessarily be tied to equal shareholding, thereby bringing 
this within one of the ‘false’ gaps incapable of being remedied by implication. 
These possibilities show that the distinction between ‘true’ and ‘false’ gaps, while 
doctrinally attractive, may not be easy to apply in practice.28 In particular, the 
parties’ pleadings and the available evidence will dictate where a particular case 
falls. Ultimately, the Court’s distinction, between a gap that is perceived as 
remediable by implication and a gap that is not, rests on the perceived difference 
between actual and presumed intentions29—a distinction that is notoriously fine.
The second step of the three­step process in Sembcorp reveals the Court’s 
understanding of the ‘business efficacy’ test. First, the Court said that there might 
be another external normative basis—quite apart from business efficacy—which 
could guide the implication of terms in a non­commercial context.30 In this 
regard, Bowen LJ’s statement of law in The Moorcock31 is worth setting out in some 
detail:
25 Sembcorp (n 1) [114]–[115].
26 ibid [116].
27 ibid [118].
28 Lord Hoffmann’s approach in Belize addresses this issue as well: Belize (n 2) [17]. If the contract is 
silent on an issue, then it is generally the case that the parties intended it to be silent: ‘The question 
of implication arises when the instrument does not expressly provide for what is to happen when 
some event occurs. The most usual inference in such a case is that nothing is to happen.’
29 Sembcorp (n 1) [29], [93].
30 ibid [85], [99].
31 (1889) 14 PD 64 (CA).
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The implication which the law draws from what must obviously have been the intention 
of the parties, the law draws with the object of giving efficacy to the transaction and 
preventing such a failure of consideration as cannot have been within the contemplation 
of either side . . . [T]he law is raising an implication from the presumed intention of the 
parties with the object of giving to the transaction such efficacy as both parties must have 
intended that at all events it should have.32
It is worth noting that Bowen LJ spoke in general terms and was certainly not 
restricting efficacy to only business efficacy. The general principle is that a term is 
to be implied to make the contract more efficacious; if it is a commercial contract, 
then it is only natural that its efficaciousness would be measured in a business 
sense. Thus, in Equitable Life Assurance Society v Hyman,33 the test was framed in a 
commercial way only because the nature of the contract was commercial. Perhaps 
the reason why the textbooks are replete with commercial examples is because 
commercial cases dominate the cases, but this should not detract from the general 
point that what is of concern is the efficaciousness of the contract, which need not 
be in the business sense. In any event, on the facts of Sembcorp, this was not in issue 
as the transaction was a commercial one.34
The Court also questions just how efficacious the contract must be made before 
the ‘business efficacy’ test is fulfilled.35 On this matter, Bowen LJ in The Moorcock 
stated that ‘a minimum of efficacy should be secured for the transaction, as both 
parties must have intended it to bear’.36 This is unsurprising and bears out the 
strict nature of implication. Drawing upon this, and because of the imprecision 
of ‘business efficacy’ as a normative concept, the Singapore Court stated that the 
role of the ‘business efficacy’ test in the implication of terms is only to identify a 
gap, but ‘it cannot supply the answer to whether a specific term should be implied.’37 
However, this may overstate the case. Sometimes, the identification of the gap 
involves a simultaneous identification of the term used to plug that gap. Take, for 
example, the facts of The Moorcock, where the contract was regarded as unworkable 
if a term were not implied that it was safe for a ship to ground at the wharf. There 
is no need to have recourse to an alternative test to imply this specific term in this 
case. The ‘business efficacy’ test both identifies the gap and supplies the normative 
reason why a particular term should be implied, as guided by the restrictive 
criterion of necessity.
32 ibid 68.
33 [2000] UKHL 39, [2002] 1 AC 408 (HL).
34 Sembcorp (n 1) [119]. Lord Hoffmann in Belize warns of the danger of ‘detaching the phrase “necessary 
to give business efficacy” from the basic process of construction of the instrument’: Belize (n 2) [23]. 
This means that his Lordship regarded the implication process as necessarily contextual and 
dependent on what a reasonable person would understand the contract to mean. However, what is 
being suggested here by the Singapore Court of Appeal is that it is only the more limited business 
efficacy test that is contextual, and not a wider approach premised on construction.
35 Sembcorp (n 1) [86].
36 The Moorcock (n 31) 69.
37 Sembcorp (n 1) [88] (emphasis in original).
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Finally, the third step of the three­step process in Sembcorp reveals the Court’s 
view of the relationship between the ‘business efficacy’ and ‘officious bystander’ 
tests. Adopting one commentator’s view, the Court found that the ‘officious 
bystander’ test is the device that enables the court to define the terms which can 
be said to reflect the parties’ presumed intention in relation to the gap in the 
contract.38 In contrast, the ‘business efficacy’ test operates at a more general level; 
its role is to identify a gap in the contract that exists because the contract can be 
made more efficacious.39 It is following the identification of such a gap that the 
‘officious bystander’ test then applies to identify the exact term that is to be implied 
to plug the gap.40 On the facts, the Equality Premise Clause was implied into the 
clauses dependent on clause 5.1 since, once a party lost the right to appoint 
directors under clause 5.1, it naturally followed that all these other clauses ceased 
to have any effect.41 Although the Court said that the traditional tests are applied 
complementarily according to its approach, the truth is that the Court departed 
from the usual understanding of the complementarity set out in Reigate v Union 
Manufacturing Co (Ramsbottom) Ltd, where Scrutton LJ described the two tests as 
follows: 
A term can only be implied if it is necessary in the business sense to give efficacy to the 
contract; that is, if it is such a term that it can confidently be said that if at the time the 
contract was being negotiated some one [sic] had said to the parties, ‘What will happen 
in such a case,’ they would both have replied, ‘Of course, so and so will happen; we did 
not trouble to say that; it is too clear.’42
Properly understood, this statement of principle in Reigate posits that the 
‘business efficacy’ test constitutes the underlying normative reason for a term to 
be implied, while the ‘officious bystander’ test takes on the more practical task of 
application. However, the Sembcorp approach would have the ‘business efficacy’ 
test fulfil a different function from the ‘officious bystander’ test. This is not 
necessarily wrong, but it should be considered that, at times, the ‘business efficacy’ 
test would alone be sufficient.
More broadly, it may be possible to conceive of an approach that straddles the 
positions taken in Belize, which stresses the overarching test of ‘interpretation’, 
and Sembcorp, which stresses the primacy of the traditional tests. It is submitted 
that there are a variety of terms implied in fact. Indeed, in certain instances, the 
courts are really ‘interpreting’ the contract even while implying terms. This is 
because they are simply extrapolating from the existing material what the parties 
had in their minds, but left unexpressed. Some support for this may be derived 
38 ibid [91].
39 ibid [90], citing  J P Vorster, ‘The Bases for the Implication of Contractual Terms’ [1988] Journal 
of South African Law 161, 171.
40 Sembcorp (n 1) [91].
41 ibid [126].
42 [1918] 1 KB 592 (CA) 605.
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from Lord Wilberforce’s speech in Liverpool City Council v Irwin, where his Lordship 
suggested that implication consists of ‘shade[s] on a continuous spectrum’.43 The 
relevant passage44 supports the existence of three types45 of terms implied in fact: 
first, terms implied as a matter of interpretation or, more precisely, extrapolation 
from the express terms as a matter of logic or obviousness; second, terms implied 
as a consequence of specific (albeit limited) creation, in order to achieve ‘business 
efficacy’; and third, terms implied as a matter of general (again limited) creation, 
in pursuance of a broader notion of reasonableness.46 It suffices to note that 
McLauchlan, who divides terms implied in fact into several distinct subcategories, 
alludes to the idea that there are distinct types of terms implied in fact, which, 
while not corresponding to Lord Wilberforce’s categories, lend support to the 
more general notion that there are different types of terms implied in fact. He 
identifies three such subcategories: terms that are implied to give business efficacy 
to a contract; terms that are implied to fill gaps in an agreement intended to be 
binding that would otherwise be void for incompleteness; and terms that are 
implied as a matter of necessity.47 Where terms are implied as a matter of necessity, 
or as an extrapolation from the express terms of the contract, it may be argued 
that there is a case for equating this exercise with interpreting the contract, but 
only in these situations. However, it may equally be true that this does not occur 
all the time, particularly when courts imply individualised terms as to a reasonable 
price or time.
In the end, perhaps the contribution that Sembcorp makes to the existing 
jurisprudence on implied terms in fact is to show the difficulty of rationalising this 
area of law through any overarching principle of interpretation. Perhaps a 
practically applicable test is what is required to guide both practitioners and 
judges in deciding whether a term should be implied. The Singaporean courts’ 
preference for the traditional tests may therefore echo the view that the generality 
of the Belize approach entails reference to those tests rather than a ‘direct resort 
to the meaning of the contract’.48
43 [1977] AC 239 (HL) 254.
44 ibid 253–54.
45 cf Gerard McMeel, The Construction of Contracts: Interpretation, Implication, and Rectification (2nd edn, OUP 
2011) [10.06]–[10.44].
46 While Lord Wilberforce refers to a fourth category, that concerns the implication of terms by law 
and is not relevant for present purposes.
47 D W McLauchlan, ‘Interpretation and Necessary Implication’ (2004) 21 New Zealand Universities 
Law Review 331.
48 H G Beale, Chitty on Contracts (31st edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) vol 1 [13­005].
